//Not a Single Russian Missile Was Stopped. Zelensky Fumes. The Hormuz Deal Is Not What It Seems
Volodymyr Zelenskyj foran et brennende Kyiv under missil- og droneangrep, med et oljetankskip i Hormuzstredet i bakgrunnen.
Kyiv ble rammet av ballistiske missiler som Ukrainas luftforsvar ikke klarte å stanse. Samtidig raser Zelenskyj mot manglende vestlige leveranser, mens avtalen om Hormuzstredet fortsatt kan etterlate verdens viktigste energikorridor stengt. Illustrasjon: AI-generert.

Not a Single Russian Missile Was Stopped. Zelensky Fumes. The Hormuz Deal Is Not What It Seems

Daily update: 5 August 2026

Kyiv crushed by 24 ballistic missiles – none shot down

During the night of 5 August, Russian forces carried out yet another massive attack on Kyiv and surrounding regions: 24 Iskander-M ballistic missiles, four Zircon/Oniks hypersonic missiles and 115 drones – most of them jet-powered Geran-4s. Ukraine’s air defence shot down 98 of the drones – but not a single ballistic missile was intercepted. At least 17 people were killed and 44 injured. Hits were recorded at 26 different locations in Kyiv and the region, with districts such as Holosiivskyi, Obolonskyi, Desnianskyi and Sviatoshynskyi affected.

The Russian Defence Ministry said the attack targeted transport, logistics and distribution centres involved in war-related activity: the MLP Chaika logistics centre used to store and distribute components for long-range drones; the Nova Poshta sorting facility in the Obolonskyi district; the Trans-Logistic transport centre producing and storing drones; the Epicenter logistics centre – a large automated warehouse for dual-use materiel; and the Brovary logistics terminal storing long-range drones and foreign-made drone components. Nova Poshta confirmed that the facility was destroyed and that two drivers and a subcontractor were killed.

The attack must be seen in context: it is one of five simultaneous Russian campaigns running in parallel. The periodic massive ballistic strike series against Kyiv. The geographically broad Kh-101 attacks on military-industrial facilities across Ukraine. The daily maritime blockade of the Black Sea coast. The tactical Geran-4 campaign against railways, petrol stations and storage infrastructure. And the FAB bombs from Su-34s against frontline positions and urban fortifications – over 8,000 FAB strikes in July alone, according to Russian military sources.

Zelensky’s media-political operation: the anger is calculated

Zelensky posted on X after the attack: “Ballistic missile interceptors could have saved the lives of those killed today. It is very important that our partners understand that delays in deliveries or a lack of will to give us anti-ballistic systems lead directly to such horrific losses and destruction”. He then met acting Defence Minister Khmara and other senior officers and complained that deliveries of air defence missiles from Western partners have fallen threefold compared with 2025.

It is necessary to see this for what it is: a media campaign with a clear purpose. Zelensky wants Patriot interceptors. But the real reason he wants them now is not only about ballistic missiles – it is about what is probably the next step in the Russian air campaign. Su-34 bombers with FAB bombs cannot yet operate over Kyiv without the risk of being shot down. Patriot systems, unlike most air defence systems, can actually shoot down manned fighters and bombers. Zelensky wants Patriots not only to stop ballistic missiles – he wants them to prevent the Su-34s from starting to drop ton-heavy FAB bombs over Kyiv.

That is a legitimate strategic need. But what Zelensky consistently fails to acknowledge is that the US is now down to around 800 PAC-3 interceptors in total – barely enough for its own needs while the war against Iran continues. Europe has massive gaps in its own air defence after years of drawing down stocks in Ukraine’s favour. According to the Daily Telegraph, Israel is now so short of air defence missiles that the US can no longer give it adequate protection. Demanding 300 interceptors – 40 percent of the entire US stockpile – is not a request. It is a demand that cannot be met.

In its coverage of the attack, the Financial Times acknowledged that Zelensky’s 40-day offensive “has brought the war closer to home for Russians, but has failed to get the Kremlin to consider a ceasefire or open meaningful peace negotiations”. It is a remarkable admission from the paper that for months portrayed the offensive as a turning point.

Rozetka and the symmetry of the warehouse war

Among the facilities attacked was Rozetka – Ukraine’s largest e-commerce company, a direct Ukrainian counterpart to Wildberries. Rozetka co-founder Iryna Chechotkina wrote: “Last night I watched three ballistic missiles hit and set fire to my life’s work”. The company confirmed it would continue operating despite the loss of one of its most important logistics facilities.

The symmetry is hard to ignore. Ukraine has carried out systematic attacks on Wildberries warehouses with the official justification that it “brings the war closer to home for Russians” and “reminds them that Russia is at war”. Russia is now attacking Rozetka and Nova Poshta facilities with exactly the same logic. Western commentators and media who applauded the Wildberries attacks now describe the Rozetka attack as an attack on “civilian infrastructure”. It is the same double standard that has marked all war coverage since 2022 – just more visible now than ever.

Drapatyi is absent – and the front pays the price

According to TASS and the Russian military commentator Vitaly Kisel, Ukrainian troops are leaving fortified positions without clear orders: “The command and control system has broken down – partly under Drapatyi, partly under Syrskyi’s arrangements. Some units obey, others do not. Some show leniency. It turns out that in the end they flee.” It is a serious diagnosis from a source close to the situation.

Syrskyi’s special forces – the “praetorian guard” he built up with brutal discipline and which played an important role in Ukrainian counterattacks – now appear to be being disbanded. Other command structures, including the Azov brigades, are said to have protested against these units getting priority for equipment. With Syrskyi gone, the conflict has been resolved by removing the units themselves. Nothing takes their place.

What is happening in Dobropillia, where the Russians are storming from the east and now from the south? What is happening in Oleksiivka near Kramatorsk? What is happening with the encirclement operation around Orikhiv and the threat of encirclement for Ukrainian troops in north-eastern Kharkiv? According to all available reports, Drapatyi is absent from all these crisis points.

The Hormuz deal: not what it seems

According to the New York Times and Reuters, Iran and Oman are close to an agreement on joint management of the Strait of Hormuz – ships entering the Persian Gulf will sail through an Iranian-controlled corridor, outbound ships will use an Omani corridor, and a “service fee” will be imposed and shared equally between the two countries.

But on Wednesday Iran sent a signal that should be read carefully: even if Iran and Oman agree on the management of the strait, that does not mean Hormuz automatically reopens. Reopening is conditional on the US actually complying with the provisions of the June memorandum – such as unfreezing Iranian assets, easing sanctions and withdrawing naval forces. None of these points has been complied with. This means the Hormuz deal between Iran and Oman can be announced – and the strait can remain closed.

Trump said on Monday that the strait could be opened “literally tomorrow”. Iran denied that any negotiations with the US are taking place at all. Rubio warned that “freedom of the seas is a fundamental principle of international trade that cannot be threatened”. And the Wall Street Journal reports that Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait are deeply unhappy with the concessions Oman is giving Iran – and may reject the whole arrangement. The global energy crisis is not over.

India caught in the crossfire of the sanctions law

The Graham–Blumenthal sanctions law is now creating a new geopolitical crisis that was not foreseen when it was conceived: India increasingly sees the law as aimed directly at it. Russian oil is in practice the only available alternative for Indian refineries at a time when Hormuz is closed and global energy shortages are severe. Threatening India with 100 percent tariffs for buying the only available energy source is not sanctions against Russia – it is an attack on Indian energy security.

The Indian analyst MK Bhadrakumar, who writes the blog Indian Punchline, says bitterly that by mishandling relations with China, the Modi government has deprived India of the opportunity to make common cause with Beijing against the law. He is an analyst who is normally pro-Western, not pro-Chinese. That he puts it this way says something about the mood in New Delhi.

The US is trying to build a global coalition against Russia. What it is actually doing is alienating India, further irritating China and forcing both into closer cooperation with Moscow. That is not a strategy. It is its opposite.